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Immigration,Exclusion, and Taxation:
Anti-ChineseLegislation in Gold Rush
California
MARK KANAZAWA
Historicalscholarshipon the politics of nineteenth-centuryChinese immigration
emphasizes the interests of labor and management in the genesis of congressional legislation in 1882 that limited Chinese immigration into the United
States. This article examines early state attempts at the exclusion of Chinese
workers after the first majorwave of Chinese immigrationduringthe California
Gold Rush. Opposition to exclusion occurred in California in the early 1850s
because Chinese immigrantswere importanttaxpayerswhen both the state and
localities were experiencing major fiscal difficulties. State attemptsto legislate
exclusion were successful only after financial conditions improved in the late
1850s.
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that beginning in the early 1850s, the Chinese immigratedwillingly,
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they encounteredvirulentdiscriminationand ultimately, legislative prohibitions on further immigrationwhen Congress enacted the Chinese
Exclusion Act in 1882. This law, subsequently renewed in 1892 and
1902, imposed restrictionson immigrationfrom China, includingpenalties of fines and possible imprisonmentfor the captainsof ships caught
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sions and on the experiences of subsequentimmigrantswho have also
been subjected to racial discrimination,which in some cases(such as
that of the Japanese)included exclusion.
The reasons for exclusion of the Chinese given by historians go beyond a naive story of simple racism or nativism. Many studies emphasize that Chinese workerscompetedwith native workersfor scarcejobs,
generatingsupportfor exclusion among the latter.' This argumentdoes
not, however, easily explain why exclusion legislation did not occur for
roughly 30 years after the first significant Chinese in-migrations. A
more realistic interest group story also recognizes that employers desired low-wage labor, perhaps opposing exclusion because the Chinese
were inexpensive, highly productive workers and their presence increased company profits and reduced the bargainingpower of native
workers.2 Some evidence suggests that exclusion was given impetus
both by depressed labor marketconditions in the late 1870s and by an
increased tendency for Chinese to compete directly with white-owned
firms.3 These explanations, based solely on the interests of labor and
management,have dominatedeconomic thinkingon the politics of Chinese exclusion.
The California Gold Rush provides a useful context in which to examine the politics of exclusion. The state experienced a massive influx
of Chinese miners in response to the discovery of gold in 1848, and
exclusionary laws were seriously considered by the legislature from
quite early on. Furthermore,the process of mining underwent an organizational transformationduring the 1850s, where initially mining
was a largely transient, entrepreneurialenterprise in which miners
were either self-employed or organized into cooperative joint stock
companies. It was only over time that mining companies adopted an
industrial model of miners working as wage labor. This means that
during the initial Gold Rush years, the labor-management interest
group model would predict representatives of mining counties to be
largely capturedby labor and thus strongly favor exclusion, because
Chinese workers lacked an effective political voice. Nevertheless, during this early period we observe significant opposition to exclusion
among miners and mining representativesin the legislature, suggesting
other factors were operant.
1

See, for example, Saxton, IndispensableEnemy,pp. 72-75; Mann,After the Gold Rush, pp.
188-93; Daniels, Asian America, pp. 33-56; Marks, Precious Dust, pp. 300-01; and Takaki,
Strangers,pp. 92, 95-99, 110-12.
2 Chiu, Chinese Labor, pp. 129-32; Brown and Philips, "Competition,"p. 63; and Daniels,
Asian America, pp. 51-52.
3 See Cross, History, p. 84; Takaki,Strangers,pp. 110-11; and Brown and Philips, "Competition,"p. 70.
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One explanationfor early oppositionto exclusion in California,largely
overlookedin existingscholarship,lies in the fact thatthe statelevied taxes
on foreignminers,which providedboth the state and countieswith mixed
incentivesto exclude Chinese miners.4On the one hand, miners favored
Chinese exclusion as a means of reducingcompetitionfor the available
gold. On the otherhand, Chineseminerscontributedsignificantlyto state
and local tax revenueswhile addingrelativelylittle demandfor public services such as schools and hospitals,being mostly adultmales. This latter
factorwas particularlysalient immediatelyafter statehoodwhen both the
stateandlocalitieswere strappedfor cash, generatingsignificantopposition
to exclusion.However,as financialconditionsimprovedover time, opposition to exclusionfell so thatby 1858, the statewas able to enactexclusionarylegislation.Exclusionof the Chinesebecamepoliticallyfeasiblein Californiaonly afterthe statehadmanagedto put its fiscal house in order.
THECALIFORNIA
GOLDRUSHAND CHINESEIMMIGRATION
The discovery of gold at Sutter's Mill in the middle fork of the
AmericanRiver in 1848 triggereda massive influx of miners into California. By 1852 a special state census reported that the non-Indian
population of the state totaled over 250,000, of which over 47 percent
resided in the seven most importantmining counties-Calaveras, El
Dorado, Mariposa, Nevada, Placer, Sierra, and Tuolumne.s Among
these miners were significant numbers from foreign countries such as
Mexico, Chile, Australia, various European countries, and of course,
China, all of whom comprisednearly one-thirdof the total populationin
these seven counties. In total there were about 25,000 Chinese immigrants, who would have comprised 10 percent of the total non-Indian
population and over 35 percent of the total foreign-bornpopulation.By
1860 the Chinese were the single largest foreign-bornethnic group in
California and comprised from 12 to 23 percent of the population of
various mining counties.6
4 This foreign miners' tax appearsin many historicaldescriptionsof the early Chinese experience in California(see, for example, Cross, History, p. 17; Chiu, ChineseLabor, pp. 10, 14, 16,
22-23; Mann,After the Gold Rush, pp. 53-56; and McClain,In Search of Equality,pp. 12, 1820), but it is typically simply provided as evidence of discriminationagainst Chinese and other
foreign miners. To my knowledge, no existing studies examine its effect on propensitiesto exclude the Chinese, though Chan briefly mentions it as a reason the Chinese were initially tolerated (see Chan,"People,"p. 74).
5U.S. Departmentof Interior,Statistical View,p. 394. These figures are probablynot entirely
accurategiven enormousdifficulties in obtainingprecise head counts, but still convey the broad
patternof populationgrowth duringthis period. See Chan, ThisBittersweetSoil, p. 42.
6 Chan, "People,"pp. 49, 73. In immigratingto the United States, many Chinese incurredsignificant amountsof debt, eitherto friends and relatives or to laborbrokers.Cloud and Galenson,
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Gold mining was initially performedin a highly labor-intensivemanner using primitive methods such as panning, or rockers and cradles.
Early miners worked alone or with a handful of partners,or organized
into joint-stock companies as entrepreneurialteams.7 These mining
methods were well suited to the limited financial resources of most
Chinese miners. Over time, mining moved to a hierarchicalindustrial
model in which Chinese (and other) workers provided wage labor to
mining companies, when majortechnological advances enabled companies to take advantageof significanteconomies of scale. Two in particular were important:the invention of hydraulic mining (which required
large amounts of water) and advances in quartzmining, both of which
transformedmining into a much more heavily capital-intensive endeavor than it had previously been. Though the precise timing of the
move from entrepreneurialto industrial mining is not entirely clear,
available evidence suggests widespreadreliance on the industrialmodel
probablydid not occur until at least the late-1850s.8
The early dominanceof entrepreneurial,not industrial,mining meant
that typically, miners or teams of miners were competing directly
against each other for the gold in a given diggings. Under these circumstances, all miners were competitive threatsbut foreign, and especially
Chinese, minersbore the bruntof antagonismfrom native miners in part
because it was easier to rationalize excluding them. As early as April
1849, the San Francisco-publishedDaily Alta Californianwas reporting
local sentiment for excluding foreign miners from working the mines.9
Contemporarynews accounts contain many descriptionsof native min"ChineseImmigrationand ContractLabor,"describe an interestinginstitutionaldevelopmentin
which organizationsrun by Chinese merchants-the so-called Chinese Six Companies-were
organized in San Francisco and were centrally involved in the recruitmentof Chinese workers,
to many of whom they advanced funds for passage to the United States. Cloud and Galenson's
interpretationof the precise natureof the involvement of the Chinese Six Companies has been
challenged by McClain, "Chinese Immigration,"but there seems little doubt that they played a
majorrole. See also Cloud and Galenson,"ChineseImmigration:Reply."
7 Paul, California Gold, pp. 50-58; Cross, History, p. 12; and Saxton, IndispensableEnemy,
p. 52.
8 According to Chiu, the move was underwayby 1852 as surface deposits near available water were alreadybecoming scarce and quartzand hydraulicmining were proving to be profitable
(Chinese Labor, p. 13). Cross seems to corroborateChiu, but identifies the change as occurring
in mid-decade(History,p. 25). However, Paul and Saxton have stressedthe financialdifficulties
of quartzmining companies during the 1850s, and Paul has concluded that quartzmining was
largely unimportantduringthe 1850s (Paul, California Gold, pp. 144-45; and Saxton,Indispensable Enemy, p. 57). Hydraulic mining was invented in 1853, but historians differ on how
quickly it came to be adoptedas common practice (see May, Origins;Paul, California Gold, p.
155; and Greenland,Hydraulic Mining, pp. 48-50). The Alta Californiancontains virtually no
evidence that mining workersclashed with mining company managementduringthe 1850s. See
also Cornford,"'We All Live,'" p. 93.
9 Alta Californian,26 April 1849.
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ers takingup armsagainst foreign miners, or combiningto expel foreign
miners from their diggings. Native miners were known to engage in intimidationof local claims recordersto discouragethem from recording
foreign claims, and to use antiforeign sentiment as a "litmus test" for
aspirantsfor political office.10
Chinese miners often bore the bruntof antagonismfrom native miners. In 1849 native miners in TuolumneCountypassed a resolutionprohibiting Chinese miners from working claims. In the early 1850s, Chinese miners were the targets of vigorous anti-Chinese sentiment in
Nevada County. In 1859 the sheriff of Shasta County requested assistance from the governorto put down an insurrectionof locals attempting to drive Chinese out of the county. Indeed, local attemptsto exclude
Chinese miners were made in various mining districts throughoutthe
state, including Agua Fria, Grass Valley, Horsetown, Oregon Gulch,
Middletown, Mormon Bar, Horse Shoe Bar, Columbia, Deer Creek,
Rough and Ready, Wood's Creek, Foster's Bar, and Yuba River
Camp."1
On occasion, prohibitionsagainst Chinese miners appearedin the bylaws of local mining districts.The 1856 by-laws of ColumbiaDistrict in
TuolumneCountyexplicitly prohibitedAsiatics and South Sea Islanders
from mining in the district.12 Similarly,the 1854 by-laws of Dutch Flat
in Placer County, and the 1857 by-laws of Centreville and Helltown in
Butte County, prohibitedChinese from purchasingmining claims.13In
other cases, district by-laws specified that only those who intended to
become citizens could hold claims, implicitly targeting Chinese miners
because federal law reserved the right of naturalizationto "free white
persons."The fact that mining districtswere largely democratic,mineroperatedfrontier institutionsconfirms the importanceof native miners
as a driving force behind exclusion duringthis period.14
Historianshave commonly ascribedantiforeignand anti-Chinesesentiments during the nineteenth century to nativist and racist tendencies,
10
See, for example,Alta Californian, 12 June 1852.
11These various evidences of discriminationagainst Chinese miners are found in a numberof
sources. See Williams, "Chinese,"pp. 65-67; Chan, This BittersweetSoil, p. 58, and "People,"
p. 74; Mann, After the Gold Rush, pp. 55-56; and Alta Californian, 26 November 1858, 4
March 1859.
12Heckendornand Wilson, Miners,p. 9.
'3 For the by-laws of Dutch Flat, see the Placer Herald, 18 November 1854. For the by-laws
of Centreville and Helltown, see U.S. Departmentof Interior, United States Mining Laws, p.
296.
14 See, for example, the 1850 by-laws of Gold Mountain district, 1851 by-laws of Union
QuartzMountaindistrict,U.S. Departmentof Interior,United States Mining Laws, pp. 331-32.
On naturalizationlaw, see Takaki,Strangers,p. 82; Mann,After the Gold Rush, p. 55. For more
on the operationof the mining districts, see Shinn, Mining Camps;Umbeck, Theory;and Clay
and Wright"Order."
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perhapsfueled by beliefs in Manifest Destiny.15The evidence presented
so far suggests that during the CaliforniaGold Rush, antipathytoward
the Chinese was driven by the simple fact that foreign miners competed
with native miners for the scarce gold, thus lowering their productivity
and expected income.16 Oppositionto Chinese workerswas rationalized
in a number of ways, including depictions of them as virtual slaves to
"foreign masters and foreign capitalists," and suggestions that their
presence had various negative, and potentially dangerous, social sideeffects withoutwhich the state would be betteroff.17
ANTI-CHINESE
LEGISLATION
Partly in response to anti-Chinesepopularsentiments,the state legislature enacted two broad measures that negatively impacted Chinese
immigrantsduringthis period. The first was a foreign miners' tax, initially institutedin 1850 when all foreign-bornminers were requiredto
pay $20 per month to obtain a license to mine for gold.' The stated aim
of this tax was to exert greatercontrol over foreign miners while raising
badly needed revenues for the depleted state treasury.Some historians,
however, have arguedthat its true aim was to drive foreign miners from
the mining regions.19 Evidence suggests it had precisely this effect in
certain areas such as the Columbiaand Sonoramining districts and, by
one estimate, as many as 10,000 miners may have been driven back to
Mexico.20 Sucheng Chan has suggested that the tax legitimized and encouragedantiforeignviolence in the mining regions, contributingto the
exodus of foreign miners.21
15 Mann, After the Gold Rush, p. 56; Rohrbough,Days, pp. 221, 228; Chan, "People," especially pp. 75-77.
16 This effect
on native wages is the theoretical prediction of a closed-economy model in
which unskilled immigrantscompete with unskilled native workers (see Friedbergand Hunt,
"Impact,"p. 28). This was an approximatelyaccuratecharacterizationof Gold Rush California.
17 California, Legislature, Report of the Committeeon Mines, p. 831. See also California,
Legislature,Majorityand MinorityReports, pp. 13, 15. These sentiments are found echoed in
testimonybefore the state senate in the late 1870s, when popularand political supportfor exclusion was growing. See Cloud and Galenson, "Chinese Immigrationand ContractLabor,"pp.
35-36.
18 "An Act for the better regulation of the Mines, and the government of Foreign Miners,"
Chapter97, Statutes of California (1850), pp. 221-23. To place this figure in context, Paul has
estimatedthat the average daily wage in the Californiagold mines in 1850 was about $10, but
also that it declined dramaticallyover the next few years (Paul, California Gold, pp. 349-50).
See also Margo, "Wages,"p. 2. It is also likely that Chinese miners received significantly less
than the averagewage (Paul, California Gold, pp. 351-52).
19Morefield,MexicanAdaptation;and Peterson,"ForeignMiners' Tax."
20Alta Californian,5 February1859; History of TuolumneCounty,pp. 28-29. Cornford,"We
All Live," p. 86.
21 Chan,"People,"pp. 64-65.
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Numerous enforcement difficulties led the legislature to repeal the
tax in the following year.22 Revenues had fallen far short of expectations, totaling less than $34,000.23 However, the legislaturerestoredthe
tax in modified form in 1852, this time charging a more modest three
dollars per month. In an attemptto improve enforcement,county sheriffs were designated as tax collectors and requiredto post a $15,000
bond to ensure payment. To provide an added incentive to pursue collection, counties were permittedto keep 50 percent of all revenues collected, minus collection costs.24 In 1853 the legislatureraised the tax to
four dollars per month.25Two years later,the legislaturedrew a distinction between foreignerseligible and those ineligible to become citizens,
calling for the tax on ineligible foreigners (that is, the Chinese) to increase by $2 per month every year.26This law was, however, repealed
the following year, when the tax was restoredto four dollars per month
for all foreign miners.27The foreign miners' tax comprised a major
source of revenue to the State governmentfor most of the period, consistently providing at least 10 percent of total state revenues from the
early 1850s until 1864 (see Figure 1).28
The state's experience with levying the foreign miners' tax should be
understoodwithin the largercontext of state finances duringthis period.
From the onset of statehood in 1850, the state experienced steady and
persistent deficits, with annual expendituresfar outpacing revenues. In
the first fiscal year ending June 1850, the state collected virtually no
revenues, while spending over $350,000. By the end of 1853 the total
civil debt of the state exceeded two million dollars. Immigrationwas
causing rapid population growth, requiring the state to spend everincreasingamountson hospitals, prisons, legislative expenses, the court
system, and other administrative expenses. Meanwhile, the state was
22

"An Act to repeal "An Act for the better regulation of the Mines, and the governmentof
Miners,"Chapter108, Statutesof California(1851), p. 424.
Foreign
23
California,Legislature,Annual Report, 1856, pp. 10-11, and Journal of the Senate, Appendix S: Reportof Mr. Green,p. 497.
24 "An
Act to provide for the Protectionof Foreigners,and to define their liabilities and privileges," Chapter37, Statutesof California(1852), pp. 84-87. The original 1850 statuterequired
all revenues minus collection costs to be paid into the state treasury.
25 "An Act to provide for the Protectionof Foreigners,and to define their liabilities and privileges," Chapter44, Statutesof California(1853), pp. 62-65.
26 "An Act to Amend 'An Act to provide for the Protectionof Foreigners,and to define their
liabilities and privileges,' passed March thirtieth, eighteen hundred and fifty-three," Chapter
174, Statutesof California(1855), pp. 216-17.
27 "An Act to
Repeal an Act entitled 'An Act to Amend "An Act to provide for the Protection
of Foreigners, and to Define their Liabilities and Privileges,"' passed March 30th, 1853, Approved April 30th, 1855, and to Revise the Original Act," Chapter 119, Statutes of California
(1856), p. 140.
28 California,Legislature,AnnualReport,variousyears 1851-1865.
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FIGURE 1

FOREIGNMINERS'TAX REVENUESAS A PERCENTAGEOF TOTAL STATE
REVENUES, SELECTEDYEARS, 1851-1865
Source: CaliforniaLegislature,AnnualReport,variousyears, 1851-1865.

experiencing enormous difficulties in raising revenues to match, particularly in the mining regions where the transientnatureof early gold
mining made it difficult to collect propertyand poll taxes.29However,
by 1857 the fiscal situationhad largely stabilizeddue to increasingsuccess in revenue collection and a major retrenchmentin administrative
expenses, and the state managed to run the smallest deficit in its brief
history. In 1858 the state enjoyed its first-everbudget surplus,and from
that point on the state was on reasonably firm financial footing. This
secular improvement in the state's finances would play an important
role in explaining political patternsof supportfor state policies regarding the Chinese.30
The second measure was legislation that more directly attemptedeither to limit Chinese immigration,or eliminate it altogether. In 1852
and 1853 the legislature enacted the commutationtax, which required
incoming ships to post a $500 bond for each foreign passenger,ostensibly as surety against their becoming a financial burdento the state.31In
29

Throughoutthe 1850s state comptrollersregularlybemoanedthe extreme difficulties associated with collecting taxes from the mining regions. See California,Legislature,Annual Re1854, p. 38; 1855, p. 32; 1857, p. 6; and 1861, pp. 5-6.
port,
30
Figures on revenues, expenditures,and debt are found in California, Legislature,Annual
variousyears 1852 to 1858.
Reports,
31
"An Act ConcerningPassengers arrivingin the Ports of the State of California,"Chapter
36, Statutes of California (1852), pp. 78-83; "An Act to Amend an Act Entitled 'an Act Con-
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practice,posting of this bond could be commutedby direct payment of
anywhere from $5 to $50 per passenger, suggesting that the legislature
was at least equally concernedwith raising revenues to meet immediate
financial needs.32In 1855 the legislature passed a law taxing arriving
vessels carryingpersons "incompetent. . . to become citizens" of the
United States,at the rate of $50 per head.33This capitationtax obviously
targetedChinese immigrants.Then in 1858 the legislature,under pressure from mining localities, imposed a ban on Chinese immigration,with
fines and possible imprisonmentfor anyone found guilty of knowingly
transportingChinese into the state.34This law was, however, declared
unconstitutionalby the state SupremeCourtearlythe following year.35
A CLOSERLOOKAT THECHINESEQUESTION
Closer examinationof the early experience of Chinese miners, however, reveals a more complex picture than the simple anti-Chineseone
painted above. Chinese miners did undertakea considerableamount of
mining and much of it underreasonablypeaceful circumstances.During
the 1850s the Alta Californiancontainsnumerousstories about Chinese
miners working their claims diligently and without interference.36
Though as we have seen, some mining district by-laws contained antiChinese provisions, the vast majority did not.37Indeed, native miners
sometimes took strong positions against mistreatmentor expulsion of
Chinese miners from their localities. In 1859, for example, a miners'
meeting in Shasta County adopted resolutions firmly opposing expulsion of Chinese miners from the county and vowing to hold accountable
county officers who failed to uphold the law and protect the rights of
the Chinese.38
cerning Passengers arriving in the Ports of the State of California',"Chapter 51, Statutes of
(1853), pp. 71-73.
California
32McClain has emphasized the distributional
consequences of this tax, noting that it was
of
tax
burden
the
the
that
bore
brunt
(McClain,In Search of Equality,pp. 12immigrants
likely
13). I would argue in addition that an importantobjective of the commutationprovision was
probablysimply to raise tax revenues at a time when the state was experiencingsevere financial
difficulties.
33 "An Act to Discourage the Immigrationto this State of Persons who cannot become Citizens thereof,"Chapter153, Statutesof California(1855), pp. 194-95.
34"An Act to preventthe furtherimmigrationof Chinese or Mongolians to this State,",Chapter 313, Statutesof California(1858), pp. 295-96.
35Alta Californian, 13 January1859.
36 See, for example, Alta Californian, 13 March 1854, 29 March 1854, 30 April 1854, 7 May
1856, 5 August 1856, 15 June 1857, 8 August 1857, 13 September1858, and 12 October 1858;
see also Paul, California Gold, p. 130; and Rohrbough,Days, p. 228.
37Heckendornand Wilson, Miners; and U.S. Departmentof Interior, United States Mining
Laws.
38Alta Californian,9 February1859.
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Given the evidence presented earlier,how do we interpretsuch concrete expressions of supportfor the Chinese presence? One explanation
is simply that a substantialsegment of the population possessed (perhaps altruistic)desires for justice and fair play and to uphold basic human and legal rights.39Additional evidence, however, suggests a number of economic factorswere probablyno less important.Contemporary
accounts strongly suggest, for example, that many were concernedthat
exclusion of the Chinese could damage trade relations with China. Indeed, this very concern was expressed in two separate committee reports in the state assembly in 1853 and 1855.40 In addition, some opposed exclusion on the grounds that the Chinese were a source of
potentially valuable cheap labor for nonmining activities such as reclamation of farmlandsin the CentralValley and constructionof transportation and water delivery facilities.41
Finally, a commonly heard argument against exclusion during the
early Gold Rush concerned its ramificationsfor the public finances of
the state and localities. Many viewed Chinese miners as an important
source of tax revenues vital to the financial stability of both the state
and the counties in which they resided. In 1855, the Alta Californian
asked the rhetoricalquestion: "Are the Chinese Injuringthe State?"Its
answer was assuredly not, that on the contrary:"Were it not for the
taxes paid by the Chinese, the credit of nearly every mining county
would now be verging on bankruptcy."42
Fouryears later,the AuburnHerald put it even more starkly:
Expel the Chinamenand Bankruptthe State. -We do not believe it practicable
or desirablethat the Chinamenshall be expelled . . and we assert this upon the
well-groundedconviction that the taxes at present derived from them are a necessity to the state; and therefore,any law that looks to their immediate expulsion from the mines, at the same time aims at the immediatecutting off of large
revenues from the several mining counties and the Stategovernment.43

39 See, for example,Alta Californian,
9 April1858and9 February1859.It shouldbe mentionedthatonemaywishto takequotesfromtheAltaCalifornian
as altruisticexpressionwitha
grainof salt, as duringthe 1850sthe newspaperwas stronglyanti-union.See, for example,
Cross,History,pp.23-24. I amgratefulto ananonymous
refereeforthispoint.
40

See California,Legislature, Majority and MinorityReports, p. 5, and MinorityReport of

theSelectCommittee,
of traderelationswithChina,see Tap. 12. Formoreon the importance
kaki, Strangers, p. 22; Daniels, Asian America, pp. 51-52; and Alta Californian, 13 January

1859.

41 California,Legislature,Report of Mr. Flint, p. 4. See also San Francisco Bulletin, 15 December 1856.
42Alta Californian,5 November 1855.
43Alta Californian,23 February1859.
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Furthermore,there was a definite sense among some in the late 1850s
that driving out the foreign miners could inflict costs on otherminers by
making it more likely that the state legislature would be forced to tax
mining claims, which were exempt from taxation after 1857. In 1859,
for example, the Shasta Republican argued against expelling Chinese
miners from ShastaCounty:
By a late decision, it has been declaredclearly within the power of the Legislature to pass a law taxing mining claims,.... Drive (the Chinese out), thus depriving (mining counties) of the heavy revenue collected from this source and
see how soon a necessity for such taxationwill become apparent.To choose, of
two evils, the least, has, for a long time, been consideredwise, and that the existence of such a law would be a greaterevil to the mining class . .. than the presence of 'poor John' appearsto be not likely to be denied.44
A SIMPLE MODEL OF TAXATION AND IMMIGRATION
RESTRICTIONS

The preceding discussion reflects a self-inflicted dilemma faced by
the state of Californiaduringthe Gold Rush. By imposing a tax on Chinese miners, the state acquireda fiscal interestin the presence of a Chinese population.This meantthat any political and other costs associated
with a Chinese presence would have to be weighed against its fiscal
benefits. Mining counties faced a similar tradeoff after 1852, when the
state permittedcounties to keep nearly half of all foreign miners' revenues collected.
A simple model will clarify the argument.Assume the government
wishes to maximize political supportamong its relevant constituencies,
and assume initially the absence of a foreign miners' tax. This government may be modeled as possessing the following objective function

L = B(E,1) - C(R,1) + A[R- E]

(1)

where I is a policy regulating immigrationof Chinese miners into the
state, E is total expendituresby the government (which buy political
support),R is total revenues (from currenttaxes, which inflict political
costs), and B(o) and C(o) are political benefit and cost functions.45
Without loss of generality, assume that I is simply the numberof Chinese miners permittedto enter the state. The state enjoys benefits and
incurs costs from the presence of Chinese miners. The benefits derive
from a largerconsumerbase, cheaperlabor for agriculture,or improved
44Alta Californian,11 February1859.
45 This model is an obvious extension of the fiscal model of Wallis, Sylla, and Legler, "Inter-

action,"pp. 123-25.
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traderelationswith China, all of which generatetangiblepolitical benefits to the government.The costs derive from political opposition from
potentiallykey constituencies(such as native miners).Assume both that
> 0. In this model,the governmentmaximizeswith
aB/laI> 0 andaC/laI
respect to immigrationby equating the marginalbenefits and marginal
costs, settingI at some level I*.46
Now consider imposing a unit tax on Chinese miners, and assume
that this tax negligibly affects how much revenue the government can
raise from other sources. Then revenues increase to R' = R + tl. However, this tax adds nothing to political costs because it is imposed on a
group with no voting and little other political power. The objective
function of the governmentis then
L = B[E, I(t)] - C[R, I(t)] + A{[R + tl(t)] - E}

(1')

Now the government maximizes by simultaneously choosing t and L
For any positive t, optimalI** exceeds originalI* because the increased
revenues permit the governmentto buy more political supportthrough
increased expenditures.Imposition of the tax generatesa fiscal tradeoff
between the stringency of the immigrationpolicy and demand by the
government for tax revenues. That is, when the government imposes
this particulartype of tax, it experiences political incentive to relax its
immigrationpolicy in orderto enjoy addedfiscal benefits.47
Models 1 and 1' embody a balanced budget constraintthat revenues
must equal expenditures.Relaxing this constraintadds a choice variable
for the government;namely, how much additionaldebt to assume in any
given time period. How this extra degree of freedom affects optimal t
and I depends upon the costs of incurringadditionaldebt. If these costs
are infinite, the government'sproblemreduces to model 1' and the gov46

Being static models, neither this model nor that of Wallis, Sylla, and Legler consider dynamic impacts of immigrationsuch as long-term fiscal impacts on governmentrevenues and
expenditures.Economists appearto be divided on the magnitudeof the long-termfiscal impact
of immigration,at least within the context of currentU.S. immigrationpolicy. Auerbach and
Oreopoulos, "Analyzing the Fiscal Impact,"use a generationalaccounting model to conclude
that the long-termfiscal impact of immigrationis likely to be "extremelysmall." However, using an overlapping generationsmodel Storesletten,"SustainingFiscal Policy," concludes that
the fiscal impactof low-skilled immigrantsis probablylow, thoughthe same is not true of highskilled immigrantsin their prime working years. Because early mining requiredlow-skilled labor, I would argue that this static model capturesthe first-orderfiscal impacts of immigration
that would have been consideredby Gold Rush legislators.
47 In the full-blown optimizationproblem, the governmentalso selects optimal t, which has
not been derived here as it is not necessary for the analysis. In the marketfor immigrants,the
market-clearingtax will equate the government's supply of immigrantslots with immigrants'
demand for these slots. It is mathematicallypossible that the market-clearingtax rate will be
zero, in which case I* = I**.
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ernmentchooses t and I**. However, if the costs are sufficiently low,
the option of assuming debt can become attractive.Then the fiscal advantages of a taxable Chinesepopulationdecrease and optimalI falls, to
I*** (< I**). Relaxing the fiscal constraintmakes maintaininga Chinese populationless desirable.
The analysis so far does not distinguishamong the political tradeoffs
confrontinglegislators representingdifferent constituencies.During the
Gold Rush, the most relevant distinction for our purposes was between
legislators representingmining interests and their nonmining counterparts. In terms of the model, throughoutthis period representativesof
mining interests experienced much higher political costs from supporting Chinese immigrationthan did nonminingrepresentatives.However,
they would have reaped more political benefits in terms of local tax
revenues after 1852, when counties began to keep half of the revenues
from the foreign miners' tax. The model thus yields an ambiguousprediction regarding the relative levels of support for exclusion among
mining versus nonmining representatives.As financial conditions improved over time, however, the relative tax benefits to mining representatives of supporting immigration declined and concomitantly, one
would predictgreatersupportfor exclusion.
EVIDENCEFROMTHELEGISLATIVE
HISTORYOF CHINESE
EXCLUSION
IN GOLDRUSHCA
POLICIES
TheLegislativeArgumentsRegardingExclusion
The issue of exclusion was brought before the legislature in 1852
when Governor Bigler called on the legislature to "check this tide of
Asiatic immigration"and keep them from taking gold out of the country.48Bigler proposed a tax on Chinese immigrantsand called on Congress to prohibit Chinese contract labor from entering the country to
mine for gold. The assembly referred the matter to its miningdominated Committee on Mines and Mining Interests, which recommended "passage of a law which shall prevent our mines from being
overrunby (the Chinese),"while supportingreinstatementof the foreign
miners' tax, though at a lower level than previously.49 A senate special
committee dominatedby nonmining interests, however, recommended

48 California,Legislature,Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate, p.

373.
49California,Legislature,Report of the Committeeon Mines, p. 831. In 1852 the seven members of the assembly Committee on Mines and Mining InterestsrepresentedYuba, El Dorado,
Placer,Mariposa,Calaveras,Nevada, and TuolumneCounties,mining counties all.
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the Chinese be expelled from the mines.50 The fact that the mining interest-dominatedassembly committee recommendednot expulsion but
rather, a tax, strongly suggests that its members believed that mining
counties had a financial interestin retainingtheirpopulationsof foreign
miners. It is also telling that the largely non-mining-dominatedsenate
committee favoredexpulsion from the mines but not from the state.51
In the following 1853 session, a bill was introducedin the assembly
permittingChinese miners to be involuntarilyejected from their claims
"by citizen miners ... desirous and preparedto work (the claims) immediately," upon payment of the value of any improvementsmade.52
This bill was reportedon unfavorablyby the Committee on Mines and
Mining Interests,still heavily dominatedby mining interests,which instead recommended that the foreign miners' license fee be increased
from $3 to $4. The Committeewas, however, deeply divided on the issue of exclusion, which generateda majorityand two minority reports.
The majority report contained a spirited defense of Chinese immigration, arguingthat it bolstered expandedtrade with China and that even
the threatof exclusion had alreadydamagedtraderelationswith China.
This reportaddedthat exclusion of foreign miners was likely to damage
the state financially: "If we exclude Chinamen and other foreigners
from the mines of California,we lose an importantpart of the source
from whence we might derive our revenue."53
Two membersof the Committee,however, submitteda fierce rebuttal
to the majority view, in which they argued strenuously for permitting
mining localities to exclude Chinese from mining. In doing so, they
downplayedthe importanceof tradewith China and focused instead on
the negative effects of Chinese immigrationon "the free white labor of
our State."54They proposed adding the following provision to the statute modifying the foreign miners' license fee:
Section 18: The provisions of this Act shall not be so construedas to preventthe
Miners in any mining districtfrom adoptingand enforcingrules and regulations
preventingforeigners,who, on account of their color, are ineligible to the rights
of citizenship from working the mines in said mining district.55
50 Report of Committeeon the Governor'sSpecial Message, pp. 736-37. Only one memberof
this committee representeda mining county(Placer),the others representedNapa/Solano, San
Diego, San Francisco,and Sacramento.
5 The senate reportsuggests that its memberswere concernedabout the effect wholesale expulsion might have on trade relations with China. See California,Legislature,Report of Committee on the Governor'sSpecial Message, p. 736.
52 California,Legislature,Majorityand MinorityReports,p. 4.

53 Ibid., pp. 5, 20-21.

54California,Legislature,Majorityand MinorityReports,p. 14.
55 Ibid., p. 13.
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This provision, which targeted Chinese miners, was narrowly defeated in the assembly in a 26 to 25 vote in which a majority of the
representativesfrom mining counties voted against it. Another provision that would have simply prohibited Chinese from working in the
mines was overwhelmingly defeated 31 to 10, with mining representatives opposed by a three-to-one margin.56Taken together, these votes
suggest that broadly speaking, in 1853 miners desired self-rule and the
right to make their own decisions, but did not favor exclusion of Chinese miners.
Within two years, however, continued Chinese immigrationhad resulted in greaterpressure on the state legislature to enact exclusionary
legislation.57In early March of 1855 three separate bills were introduced in the assembly that would have prohibitedChinese from mining.
These were all referredto a select committee dominatedby mining representativesthat reportedback a bill embracingthis exclusionaryprinciple. In fact, the committeereportwent further,arguingthat as a matter
of constitutionallaw, the state had the right to expel the Chinese from
the state altogether.58The reportalso downplayedthe contentionof the
previous committee on the importanceof liberal immigrationpolicy in
encouragingand supportingChinese trade. All of which strongly suggests that the attitudes of mining interests regarding exclusion had
changed dramaticallysince 1853. It should also be noted that a motion
in the assembly to kill the bill was handily defeated, 51 to 14, as representatives from mining counties voted overwhelmingly against killing
the bill by a betterthan six-to-one margin.
It is worth mentioning that S. B. Stevens, an assemblyman from
CalaverasCounty, an importantmining county, authoreda minorityreport that strongly opposed excluding the Chinese from mining. Stevens
emphasizedthe importanceof Asian tradeand the likely negative effect
of exclusion on that trade. However, he also expressed concerns that
lost tax revenues from exclusion of Chinese miners would likely force
the state to raise taxes on other miners.59 In interpretingthis report,two
facts are importantto keep in mind. First, CalaverasCounty had one of
the largest foreign-bornpopulations of any county in the state, both in
absolute terms and as a percentageof total county population,meaning
that the local loss of tax revenues from exclusion would likely have
been considerable.60 Second, whereas Stevens voted to kill the exclu56 California, Legislature, Journal of the Assembly, 3rd session, pp. 287-88.

57See, for example, Mann(1982),p. 62; McClain(1994),pp. 17-18.
58 California, Legislature, Reports of the Select Committee, p. 6.
59 California, Legislature, Minority Report of the Select Committee, p. 12.

60According to the 1852 census, over half of the population of CalaverasCounty was foreign-born,second in the state only to San FranciscoCounty.
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sion bill, the other two representativesfrom CalaverasCounty did not.
This intracountysplit suggests strong local ambivalence about the desirabilityof exclusion in a heavily mining-dependentregion.
In any case, exclusion of the Chinese from mining never became law,
as this bill was supercededby anotherone calling for the capitationtax
referredto earlier that taxed incoming vessels $50 for every Chinese
immigrantbroughtinto the state. In enactingthis tax, the legislaturewas
drawing a key distinction between new Chinese immigrantsand Chinese already present in the state. The senate committee that recommended this capitation tax downplayed its possible negative effect on
trade relations with China. It was, however, highly ambivalent about
expelling the existing Chinese population from the mines, arguing that
the expulsion would cause problemselsewhere as the displaced Chinese
miners flooded into cities and agriculturalareas. Also importantin the
committee's view, however, was the negative impact such expulsion
would have on the local finances of the mining counties:
Another consideration,entitled to some weight in the estimation of your Committee, arises from the fact, that one-half of the nett(sic) proceeds of this foreign
miners' tax, is paid into the various county treasuriesof the counties in which it
is collected, and to abruptlytake that source of revenue away from them, while
many of them have heavy debts hanging over them, would be doing them injustice, and create a necessity for a very great increase of taxation,which would be
burdensomeupon their citizens.61

Given this fiscal reality, the committee arguedthat it would be better
to allow the Chinese to remain until counties had their fiscal houses in
order.
The capitationtax turned out to be highly controversial,and by the
next year the assembly had received a number of petitions requesting
reductionof the tax, which were referredto its Committeeon Mines and
Mining Interests. The Committee report recommended keeping the
capitation tax and advanced an extensive legal and philosophical defense of the right of the state to exclude anyone it chooses, if in the best
interestsof the state. In response to argumentsthat Chinese immigration
provided financial and commercial benefits to the state, it loftily retorted that "in a question of this kind we must be governed by considerations of a higher characterthan dollars and cents."62The legislature
followed its recommendationand retainedthe capitationtax. The report
did not explicitly addressthe possible effect of Chinese exclusion on tax
revenues but did recommendthat the action of the previous legislative
61 California,Legislature,ReportofMr. Flint, p. 6.
62 California,Legislature,Reportof Committeeon Mines and MiningInterests (1856), p.

11.
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session to increase the foreign miners' license fee be overturnedand
that it be restored to its $4 per month level. This suggests that it believed that the previously higher fee levels were having a negative effect on tax revenues,perhapsby discouragingChinese from mining.
Finally, in 1858 the legislaturepassed a law prohibitingChinese immigration and calling for fines and possible imprisonmentfor anyone
found guilty of transportingChinese workers into the state.63This bill
was passed in the assembly 50 to 21, with representativesof the most
heavily mining counties virtuallyunanimousin favor, while otherswere
evenly split. In securing passage, an amendment was defeated that
would have exempted eight southernand coastal counties from its operation.This amendmentenjoyed unanimoussupportof the representatives of those eight exempted counties, indicatingthey fully expected to
enjoy significantbenefits from continuedimmigrationof the Chinese. It
should be mentioned that each of these eight counties had a relatively
light foreign presence, with foreigners comprising less than 10 percent
of the county population, well below the state average. The bill then
went to the senate, where it passed by a narrowermargin, 15 to 10,
again with strongsupportfrom mining representatives.
Analysis of ExclusionLegislation
The preceding discussion indicates that legislative support for Chinese exclusion increased between the early- and late-1850s and also
strongly suggests that legislative concerns regardingthe impact on the
financial condition of mining counties may have temperedoppositionto
exclusion. I now provide more systematic evidence that corroborates
this temporaltrend in supportfor exclusion and also links local financial conditionsto patternsof supportfor exclusion.
Considerfirst the patternsof supportfor Chinese exclusion in several
key roll call votes in the assembly and senate in 1853 and 1858. The
1853 votes, both in the assembly, concern the two measures mentioned
earlierthat would have made it easier to exclude the Chinese from mining. The first is the proposed Section 18 that would have allowed mining districts to enact rules to exclude Chinese miners. The second bill
would have prohibited Chinese from mining entirely. The 1858 votes
are the senate and assembly votes to prohibit Chinese immigrationto
the state. Table 1 reportsthe votes on these measuresamong representatives of the 12 counties where mining was occurring in significant
amounts.In columns 1 and 2, "Yes" votes are votes to strike or weaken
63"An Act to preventthe furtherimmigrationof Chinese or Mongolians to this State."Chapter 313, Statutesof California(1858), pp. 295--96.
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TABLE 1

SUMMARY, ROLL-CALLVOTES ON 1853, 1858 VOTES

County

Value of Gold
Productionas a
Percentageof Total
ManufacturingValue,
1860

Mariposa
Nevada
Tuolumne
Sierra
Calaveras
Amador
Trinity
Tulare
Placer
Siskiyou
Plumas
El Dorado
Subtotals
Mining Counties
All Others
Total

0.987
0.880
0.852
0.830
0.775
0.726
0.706
0.659
0.610
0.582
0.395
0.295

1853
(1)
VOTE1

1858
(2)
VOTE2

(3)
Senate

(4)
Assembly

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

1
2
2
0
2

0
0
2
1
1

1
1
1
1
2

0
0
3
0
0

1

1

2

0

2
1

0
0

2
1

0
0

1

3

1

1

1
0
2
0
1
1
1
0
2
1
1
4

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2
5
4
2
2
2
0
1
3
1
2
6

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

12
14
26

8
17
25

12
19
31

4
6
10

14
1
15

0
10
10

30
20
50

1
20
21

Notes: VOTEl: To strike Section 18, substitutethat Collector receives 27 percent,Recorderreceives 3 percent,of all foreign miners' license fee revenues raised in county. VOTE2: To reject
substitutethat prohibitspersons ineligible for citizenship from working in the mines. 1858: To
exclude Chinese from immigratingto the state.

exclusion in 1853. No clear pattern is apparentbesides the general,
largely across-the-boardopposition of mining representativesto excluding the Chinese from mining.64Columns 3 and 4, however, indicatethat
by 1858, the attitudes of mining representativeshad changed dramatically to virtualunanimityin favor of exclusion, this time from the state
entirely. Had this shift not occurred, exclusion would likely not have
been enacted in 1858 because nonmining assemblymen were deadlocked on, while nonmining senatorswere virtuallyunanimousagainst,
exclusion.
A simple econometric analysis helps to understandlegislative attitudes toward Chinese exclusion and why these changed over time. The
basic model, applied to both the 1853 and 1858 votes, assumes that legislative supportfor exclusion was potentiallyinfluencedby the extent of
the Chinese presence, the importanceof mining, financial conditions,
and stakes in the Chinese trade, all on the local level. The basic model
is then
64For the votes on VOTE] and VOTE2,see California,Legislature,Journal of the Assembly,
3rd session, pp. 287-88.
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PROB =f(CHINESE,MINING,FINANCIAL,TRADESTAKES) (2)
where PROB is the probabilityof voting for exclusion.
For the econometric analysis of the 1853 measures, VOTE] and
VOTE2are pooled to conserve degrees of freedom, thus providing 91
observations. The dependentvariable, VOTE53,equals one if a representative voted "Yes" on a given vote and equals zero if the representative voted "No." In all cases, therefore,a "Yes"vote may be interpreted
as a vote against exclusion. The Chinese presence is capturedby the
variable FOREIGN, defined as the total number of foreign-bornmale
residents in a county as a percentage of total county population,based
on figures in the 1852 census.65 The local importanceof mining is captured by the variable MINING%,defined as total value of mining production within a county as a percentageof total manufacturingvalue in
1860, the nearest census year for which manufacturingand mining values are available.66Stakes in the Chinese trade are captured by a
dummy variable SANFRANCISCOthat equals one if the legislator
represents San Francisco and zero if not. This variable captures trade
stakes imperfectlyas other areas of the state also had a stake in Chinese
trade,but there is little doubtthat San Franciscooccupied a uniqueposition in terms of expectationsof tradebenefits.
Comprehensive,consistent informationon local financial conditions
duringthis early period is difficult to obtain. We do know, however, the
identities of those counties that had incurreddebt by 1853 because such
debt had to be authorizedby special acts of the legislature.67Prior to
1853 six counties, all mining counties, had been authorizedby the legislature to float bond issues: Calaveras, El Dorado, Nevada, Placer, Sierra, and Siskiyou. To capturethe financial condition of a county, the
dummy variable DEBT equals one if a county had been authorizedby
the legislatureto float a bond issue priorto 1853 and equals zero if not.
A final factor to consider is north-south sectional differences that
may have affected voting behavior in the assembly. Histories and contemporaryaccounts have described strong differences over taxationbetween mining counties and counties in the southernpart of the state.
Southerncounties complainedof having to pay more than their shareof
propertytaxes because the gold mines were situated on federal public
65 U.S. Departmentof the Interior,Statistical View,p. 394. This variable obviously overstates
the total number of Chinese residents. Total foreign residents is used because comprehensive
county-level dataon Chinese residentsare not available.
66U.S. Departmentof the Interior,Census of Manufactures,pp. 23-36.
67 Beginning in 1852, such county-level funding acts were enacted every year by the legislature for at least the next six years.
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lands, which were not subject to propertytax.68This dispute over taxes
regularlyarose duringthe 1850s and was serious enough that by the eve
of the Civil War, several southerncounties favored breaking off from
the rest of the state.69If foreign miners were contributingimportantlyto
tax revenues, southerncounties may have opposed excluding them from
mining. To capturethese sectional differences, I createda dummy variable SOUTH that equals one for southerncounties and equals zero for
all othercounties.70
Assuming a logit specification, the estimations are performedon the
following model
ln[P/(1 - P)] = PO + /il FOREIGN +

/12 (DEBTX FOREIGN)+ /13 MINING%+
,f4 (DEBTX MINING%)+ f/5 SOUTH+
+u
*j6SANFRANCISCO+ 17 VOTEDUMMY

(3)

where P is the probabilityof a "Yes" vote and VOTEDUMMYequals
zero if the vote is on VOTE] and equals one if on VOTE2.There are
several importantthings to notice about this specification. First, the interaction term between DEBT and FOREIGN permits the effect of a
greater foreign presence on opposition to exclusion to differ between
indebted and non-indebtedcounties. Recalling that only mining counties had incurreddebt by this time, mining counties with no debt may
favor exclusion because Chinese miners competed with native miners
for the gold, but their indebtedcounterpartsmay not because of greater
concerns for lost tax revenues. Similarly, the interactionterm between
DEBT and MINING%permits support for exclusion in more heavily
mining counties also to be temperedby the presence of debt.71 Finally,
the inclusion of VOTEDUMMY
permitsthe probabilityof opposition to
exclusion to differ depending upon the stringency of the exclusion
measurethe vote would allow.
The results of logit estimations of model 3 are reportedin Table 2.
The problemarose that (DEBTXFOREIGN)and (DEBTXMINING%)
68
See Ellison, Self-GoverningDominion, pp. 66-67; and California,Legislature,Journal of
the Assembly,3rd session, pp. 12-13.
69 See, for example, Ellison, Self-GoverningDominion, pp. 167-91; and Caughey, California,
pp. 336-37.
70 The southerncounties are Fresno, Los Angeles, Monterey,San Bernardino,San Diego, San
San Luis Obispo, SantaBarbara,and SantaCruz.
Joaquin,
71
It should be noted that the theoreticaleffect of MINING%on supportfor exclusion is ambiguous. In the absence of debt considerations, support for exclusion among native miners
would have depended upon how intensely they competed for gold with Chinese miners. Such
competitioncould have been more or less intense in more heavily mining-intensivecounties.

Immigration,Exclusion, and Taxation

799

TABLE
2
LOGITESTIMATIONSOF ANTI-EXCLUSIONVOTES IN 1853 ASSEMBLY
Variable
Constant
FOREIGN
(DEBTX FOREIGN)
MINING%
(DEBTX MINING%)
SANFRANCISCO
VOTEDUMMY
SOUTH

(1)

(2)

-0.03
(0.52)
-3.68*
(2.17)
3.79*
(2.16)
1.45
(1.01)

0.11
(0.50)
-2.11
(1.83)
4.47**
(2.15)

2.00*
(1.06)
1.10**
(0.48)
0.29
(0.69)
-53.69
0.626

1.13
(0.86)
1.12**
(0.48)
0.30
(0.66)
-54.79
0.637

-

(3)

(4)

-0.13
(0.52)
-3.03
(2.15)

-0.06
(0.51)
-1.82
(1.78)

1.09
(1.04)
2.42**
(1.19)
1.80*
(1.05)
1.13**
(0.49)
0.34
(0.69)
-53.09
0.626

2.76**
(1.13)
1.17
(0.85)
1.15**
(0.48)
0.17
(0.68)
-53.66
0.615

Log likelihood
Percentagecorrect
*=
Significantat the 90-percentlevel.
** = Significantat the 95-percentlevel.
Notes: Figures in parenthesesare estimatedstandarderrors.N = 91.

were highly multicollinear,so that both variableswere highly insignificant when included simultaneously. I thereforereportthe results of estimations with each included separately.The strikingresult is that debt
seems to matter.Regarding the presence of foreigners, the results provide weak evidence that a greater foreign presence in nonindebted
counties increases supportfor exclusion (/l < 0), but columns 1 and 2
reveal that the same was not true among indebted counties (1l + 62 is
not significantly different from zero). In columns 3 and 4, among nonindebted counties opposition to exclusion is essentially unchanged as
the local economy becomes more mining-intensive (,f3 not significantly different from zero). However, among indebted counties, oppo> 0). These
sition to exclusion increased with mining intensity
(,#4 of foregone
findings reflect both that the costs of exclusion in terms
tax revenues were higher for indebted counties and that these costs increased as these counties relied more heavily on mining in their local
economies.
Finally, the result on SOUTH (,85 insignificant) indicates no systematic opposition to exclusion by southerninterests. Because there is ample evidence that southerncounties were aware that they were bearinga
disproportionateshare of state taxes even at this early stage, one possible interpretationis that they did not perceive the presence of foreign
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miners to be a contributingfactor.72 The fact that the coefficient on
SANFRANCISCOis borderlinesignificant provides weak evidence that
trade interests opposed exclusion of the Chinese from mining. This
variable is, however, an imprecise proxy for the stakes of California
merchantsin the Chinese trade,which may also explain its relative lack
of significance. It is also impossible to dismiss other hypotheses, such
as the concerns expressed by the 1853 senate committee that exclusion
from the mines might lead to massive relocations of Chinese to other
areas of the state, includingcities such as San Francisco.
To understandhow and why legislative attitudestowardsthe Chinese
presence apparentlychanged by 1858, I now turnto the roll-call vote in
the assembly on passage of the 1858 exclusion act. The dependentvariable here is VOTE58,equal to one if a representativevoted "Yes" and
equal to zero if the representativevoted "No." The basic model is the
same, though with a few subtle differences. First, improvedcensus data
in 1860 permitme to capturethe Chinese presence with the actualnumber of Chinese, not foreign, residents. The variable is CHINESE,defined as the number of Chinese as a percentageof the total population
of a county in 1860.73
As before, supportfor exclusion is potentiallyinfluencedby stakes in
the Chinese trade, the local importanceof mining, and local indebtedness, which are again captured by SANFRANCISCO,MINING%and
DEBT. In addition, I control for a structuralchange that occurred in
1856. The debt that had accumulatedin the early 1850s occurreddespite
a constitutionalprovision limiting state debt to no more than $300,000
in total.74The state's growing indebtednesswas eventually challenged
in court and in 1856 the state supremecourt, in People v. Johnson, declared this debt unconstitutionalin overturninga statute that called for
the state to take on more debt to build a wagon road.75By calling a halt
to increased state debt, People may have raised the expectationthat reduced revenues resulting from exclusion would be reflected in reduced
state expendituresratherthan increasedstate debt.76Thus, localities that
stood to lose the most from reduced expendituresmay have opposed
exclusion. To allow for this possibility, I created the variable
SCHOOLEXP,defined as total expenditureby the state on schools in
72 Annual Message of the Governor,California,Legislature,Journal of the Assembly,3rd session, p. 13. See also Ellison, Self-GoverningDominion, pp. 174-75.
73U.S. Departmentof the Interior,Census of 1860, p. 28.
74Statutesof California(1850); and Constitutionof the State of California,Appendix,p. IX.
756 Cal 499(1856). See also Nougues v. Douglass 7 Cal 65(1857), in which the Court struck
down a statutecalling for constructionof a new State capitol.
76 Recall that in my model, a tighteningof the balanced-budgetconstraintincreasedthe shorttermbenefits of immigrationby permittingthe state to maintainor increase expenditures.
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the county representedby a legislator in 1858. School expenditures
were by far the largest and most importantcomponent of county-level
state spendingthat is available from public documents.The assumption
is that counties enjoying the largest state expenditureson schools could
potentially be hurt the most by the loss of tax revenues attendanton
Chinese exclusion, in which case the coefficient on SCHOOLEXPis
predictedto be negative.
Again assuminga logit specification,the model I estimatehere is
ln[P/(1 - P)] = fO + /ll CHINESE +

f12(DEBTX CHINESE)+ fl3 MINING%+

+
+
f14 (DEBTX MINING%) /35 SCHOOLEXP

+u
f16SOUTH+ /P7SANFRANCISCO

(4)

This model is virtually identical to model 3, except for the addition of
SCHOOLEXPand the omission of VOTEDUMMY,which is now unnecessary. The results of a series of estimationsare reportedin Table 3.
The most strikingresult is the highly significant negative coefficient on
SCHOOLEXP,which indicates that localities with greaterstakes in the
state budget more strongly opposed exclusion, even when we control
for the amountof local indebtedness.This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that exclusion was perceived to have adverse financial implications for localities, operatingthroughthe state budget. The fact that
the model performs noticeably worse when SCHOOLEXPis excluded
confirms its importance,and the fact that the other coefficients in the
model do not improve in significance indicates that their lack of significance is not due to collinearitywith SCHOOLEXP.The findings on the
coefficient on CHINESEsuggest that supportfor exclusion was moderately stronger where the Chinese presence was greater, as predicted.
The relative insignificance of this coefficient when MINING%and
(DEBT X CHINESE)are included in part reflects significant multicollinearity among these variables." The negative coefficient on SOUTH
indicates the definite presence of the north-southrift described in the
histories. The positive coefficient on SANFRANCISCOindicatesthat by
1858, any additional stakes in the Chinese trade enjoyed by the city
were now more than outweighed by other factors, such as competition
with urban labor. Again, given that this variable is an imprecise proxy
for stakes in the Chinese trade, interpretationof this result is somewhat
problematic.
77The correlation coefficient between CHINESE and MINING% is 0.54, and between
CHINESEand (DEBTX CHINESE)is 0.80.
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TABLE
3
LOGITESTIMATIONSOF EXCLUSIONVOTE IN 1858 ASSEMBLY
Variable

Constant
CHINESE
(DEBTX CHINESE)
MINING%
(DEBTX MINING%)
SCHOOLEXP
SOUTH
SANFRANCISCO

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

1.21
(0.86)
0.45
(0.61)
-0.28

1.23
(0.85)
0.48
(0.56)
-0.27

1.38*
(0.81)
0.17*
(0.10)

1.39*
(0.81)
0.19**
(0.09)

-0.13
(0.61)
0.40
(0.46)
-0.27

(0.59)

(0.53)

1.46
(2.11)
--0.67

-

2.13
(4.65)

-0.62***
(0.24)
-1.98*

-0.64***
(0.24)
-1.80*

(4.74)
-0.63***
(0.24)
-2.15*

(1.15)

(1.09)

(1.12)

5.03*
(2.87)
-23.00
0.871

5.77**
(2.70)
-23.26
0.857

4.98*
(2.82)
-23.21
0.871

Log likelihood
Percentagecorrect
*=
Significantat the 90-percentlevel.
** = Significantat 95-percentlevel.
*** = Significantat 99-percentlevel.
Notes: Figures in parenthesesare estimatedstandarderrors.N= 70.

(0.44)

1.71
(1.71)

1.14
(2.09)
-0.64***
(0.24)
-2.07*

-1.46

(1.11)

(1.03)

5.16*
(2.78)
-23.35
0.871

1.65
(1.14)
-27.17
0.771

Finally, it is noteworthythat the coefficient on MINING%is totally
insignificant. This relatively weak finding may reflect the fact that as
we saw earlier,by 1858 mining had become more of a capital-intensive
industrial endeavor where miners worked for companies under wage
contracts. Consequently, support for exclusion among mining workers
who competed with Chinese immigrantsfor access to gold may have
been counterbalancedby oppositionto exclusion among mining companies, who desired largerpools of cheaper labor. This finding is consistent with historianswho have argued that employers provided a counterweightto the demandsof laborto exclude the Chinese.
CONCLUSIONS
The early experiences of Chinese immigrantsin Gold Rush California were shaped by a complex set of economic factors that centered on
their new role as participantsin the labor market for the burgeoning
mining industry.No doubt native miners perceived the Chinese to be a
competitive threat and engaged in various discriminatorypractices designed to extract greater rents from the available gold. The perceived
threatposed by the Chinese gave rise to observablepublic supportfor
exclusion as early as 1852. During the early 1850s, however, political
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supportfor exclusion was mitigatedby several factors including possible altruistic concerns for the rights of the Chinese, mercantile concerns that trade with China might be damaged, demands for cheap labor for nonmining endeavors such as agriculture, and the fact that
Chinese miners were contributingsignificant amounts of tax revenues
to both the state and mining counties when both were experiencing
major fiscal difficulties. These factors combined to forestall exclusion
for several years. By the end of the 1850s, however, continued Chinese immigrationand gradual improvementin the state's finances led
tax interests to favor more restrictive exclusionary policies. Even then,
the fiscal consequences of exclusion were a definite source of concern,
though they were not sufficient to defeat exclusion legislation. Thereafter, the interventionof the courts was necessary to ensure continued
Chinese immigration.
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